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Abstract: Monetary policy contributes to stabilize growth. Particularly in a reforming context for financial and economic 
activities, it is important to know how central bankers’ decisions through the short term interest rate of the money market 
are transmitted to the real variables: the GDP and the inflation. Few studies on monetary transmission mechanisms deal 
with the Maghreb countries. Structural VAR are used to investigate the importance of various monetary transmission 
channels at a macro scale from convenient impulse response functions. As a result, the Tunisian central bank should 
mainly target inflation, focussing the interest rate channel and the long-term interest rate as the principal transmission 
variable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Monetary policy must guarantee a steady environment 
for growth. Various channels transmit the decision of central 
bankers to the real sphere. Theoretically, thanks to the fa-
mous survey in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Ber-
nanke and Gertler [1], Meltzer [2], Mishkin [3], Taylor [4]), 
we can schematize monetary transmission mechanism as a 
network of linkages going from the monetary policy instru-
ment to its targets on the real sphere (inflation and output 
gap) through intermediate variables (the transmission vari-
ables). 
  Our analysis highlights the effects of short-term and 
long-term interest rate shock on both targeted variables - the 
inflation rate and the gross domestic product (Gdp) - through 
traditional transmission variables such as the long-term in-
terest rate, the cost credit, the volume credit and the ex-
change rate. Opposite to other channels that need an effec-
tive fluctuation in the monetary policy instrument, an-
nouncement effects influence the real sphere only through 
the threat of the central bank intervention. In this way, the 
announcement effects channel deserves a specific treatment 
and will not be considered in the application. 
  Monetary policy is useful to obtain a stable macroeco-
nomic environment in favor of a steady growth. When the 
economic context is characterized by reforms influencing the 
financial as well as the real sphere, it is a great importance to 
better know the ways central bankers’ decisions are transmit-
ted to the real variables. However, there are few studies on 
monetary transmission mechanisms that deal with the 
Maghreb countries like Chaabane and Hachicha [5]. These 
developing countries face several mutations. Until the early  
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1980s, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia - albeit to different 
degrees - pursue inward-looking economic development 
strategies emphasizing a key role of national regulator insti-
tutions in order to accelerate the economic development. 
  In Tunisia, steps to enhance competition among banks 
have accelerated since 1986 from measures enlarging the 
scope of activities for foreign banks into the domestic econ-
omy. Offshore banks can: collect deposits from residents, 
finance some resident firms acting in the productive sector, 
extend credits in local currency from deposits collected from 
residents, and engage medium and long-term lending in 
foreign exchange as well as finance resident import and 
export. These changes theoretically permit to increase the 
amount of domestic credit to finance productive investments 
and durable consumption. 
  Besides, Tunisia's reform efforts also included a gradual 
liberalization of interest rates except for interest rates on 
lending to priority sectors in the developing strategy. In 1987, 
interest rates on term deposits of at least three months are 
liberalized and rates on special savings accounts are pegged 
to the money market rate (MMR) of the preceding month. 
Lending rates, except those to priority sectors, are allowed to 
be set freely within a spread of 3 percentage points above the 
MMR. In 1990, preferential rates are increased for all priority 
sectors, albeit only moderately for the agricultural sector. In 
1994, lending rates for non-priority sectors are completely 
liberalized, and in late 1996 preferential interest rates for 
priority sectors are abolished. The requirement for prior 
authorization of loans by the Central Bank is eliminated in 
1988. In 1994, the banks obligation to subscribe to and hold 
treasury bills is abolished. Obligatory sectorial lending ratios 
are suppressed in late 1996, along with preferential refinanc-
ing rates. It is worth noting that most deposit and lending 
rates in Tunisia are indexed on the MMR, i.e., deposit rates 
remain fixed to at most 2 percent on sight deposits and MMR 
minus 2 percent for savings deposits. 2    The Open Economics Journal, 2009, Volume 2  Bates and Hachicha 
  All these changes are in line with fluid liquidity circuit. 
Morocco and Tunisia have made important progress over the 
last decade toward establishing a sound bank intermediation, 
deepening their financial markets, mobilizing domestic fi-
nancing, and using indirect market-based monetary policy 
instruments. 
  Nevertheless, in many respects, their financial sectors 
still fall short of achieving the dynamism, efficiency, and 
depth of full-fledged market-based financial systems in in-
dustrial countries or in the most advanced developing coun-
tries. This reflects the fact that some of the key reforms are 
implemented only partially while others are introduced only 
recently and therefore have not yet produced their full im-
pact. In this case, it is convenient to identify how the mone-
tary policy can find their positive impacts improving a more 
stable macroeconomic environment. Considering the ongo-
ing economic mutations and owing to the lack of empirical 
studies, a better knowledge of monetary transmission is a 
contribution of a great importance for the central banking 
activity. Choosing Tunisia as an example, the asset prices 
channel cannot be analysed because of the lack of data. 
Anyway, in this empirical analysis, one question finds its 
answer. Which transmission channels are effective and base 
the choice of intermediary targets for the monetary policy to 
create a monetary regulation favourable to a steady growth? 
  The paper is organized as follows. After a detailed pres-
entation of the empirical method, we report and comment the 
results for the Tunisian case. To conclude, we get some les-
sons for the Tunisian monetary policy considering it is one 
of the first analyses in the field for a Maghreb country. 
EMPIRICAL METHOD 
  The Structural VAR (SVAR) methodology has become a 
widely useful tool in the analysis of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanisms. SVAR models provide a certain mix be-
tween atheoretical method and approach coherently based on 
economic theory as defined in Fry and Pagan [6]. 
  Because economic interpretations of reduced form VAR 
equations do not take into account the information in the 
medium and long run, we adopt SVARs and use eligible 
economic theory and econometric considerations to impose 
the structure of the system. In this class of models, identifi-
cation especially focuses on the errors of the system, which 
are interpreted as linear combinations of exogenous shocks. 
  Our empirical approach is based on a VAR, which is 
partitioned into two types, i.e. the standard SVAR AB model 
of Amisano and Giannini [7] and the SVAR model of 
Blanchard and Quah [8]. The purpose is to quantify the ef-
fects of each channel at short term and long term separately. 
  As in Mehrotra [9], a reduced form VAR model can be 
written as: 
Zt = A1 . Zt-1 +…+ Aq . Zt-q + C . Dt + ut             (1) 
where q denotes the order of the VAR model. Zt= (Z1t, …, 
Zkt)
’ is a (k  1) random vector, Ai are fixed (k  k) coeffi-
cient matrices. C is the coefficient matrix associated with the 
possible deterministic terms Dt. ut is a k dimensional white 
noise process. The structural representation of (1) can be 
expressed as: 
A . Zt = A1
* . Zt-1 +…+ Ap
* . Zt-p + C
* . Dt + B . t           (2) 
  Here, the structural errors are assumed to be white noise, 
the coefficient matrices are different from the reduced form 
coefficients in (1). The matrix A allows modelling the in-
stantaneous relations while B is a structural form parameter 
matrix. The structural shocks t are related to the model 
residuals by linear restrictions. Omitting deterministic terms, 
the equation (2) is written as follows because they are unaf-
fected by impulses hitting the system and do not affect such 
impulses: 
A . Zt = A1
* . Zt-1 +…+ Ap
* . Zt-p + B . t             (3) 
  In order to link both reduced and structural forms, we 
multiply (3) with A
-1, whereby Ap = A
-1 . Ap
* (p = 1,…, N). 
According to Breitung, Bruggemann and Lütkepohl [10], the 
relation between the reduced form disturbances and the 
structural form innovations is expressed as: 
ut = A
-1 . B . t                   (4) 
and 
u = A
-1 . B . B’ . A
-1’                 (5) 
  u is the maximum likelihood estimator of the reduced 
form model. 
  To estimate, we use the maximum likelihood from a 
scoring algorithm as in [7] or [10]. It is worth noting that if 
the algorithm does not converge, some manual fine-tuning 
may be necessary. 
  If an over-identified model is estimated, the following 
expression computes the value of a likelihood ratio statistic: 
LR = T . (log|u
r| - log|u|)               (6) 
  u
r is the equivalent estimator u from the restricted 
structural form estimation. 
  In the Blanchard and Quah model A = Ik and the matrix 
of long run effects (Ik - A1 - A2 - Ap)
-1 . B is assumed to be a 
lower triangular. 
  The impulse responses are computed from the estimated 
VAR coefficients, and the Hall percentile interval is chosen 
to build confidence intervals (CI) that reflect the estimation’s 
uncertainty: 
 C I = [1 - t
*
(1-/2), 2 - t
*





(1-/2) respectively are the /2 and the (1-/2) 
quantiles of the distribution of CI = [1 - 2] (see Hall [11]). 
  0.5 . (k
2 + k - 1) restrictions have to be imposed for the 
identification of the system. 
Choice of Variables 
  To capture the interest rate, the credit channel (in volume 
and in cost) and the exchange rate channel of the monetary 
policy, several macroeconomic variables are needed. 
 S tir defines the short-term interest rate of the money 
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According to Ganev, Molnar, Rybinski and Wozniak [12], it 
is inappropriate to choose a monetary aggregate. Indeed, it 
plays a less significant role in the monetary transmission 
particularly in the case of developing countries. 
  In term of monetary transmission variables, Ltir is the 
long-term interest rate. It is proxied by the 10 years govern-
ment bond yields. The lending rate (Lr) measures the credit 
cost and Dcred represents the amount of domestic credit to 
the private sector. These last two variables are necessary to 
capture the lending and the balance sheet channels that both 
operate through transmission mechanisms in terms of credit 
cost and volume. Rer is the real effective exchange rate 
useful to include the exchange rate channel in the analysis. 
As the exchange rate channel depends on the price fluctua-
tions registered by the main commercial partners in relation 
to the home prices, the interest of Rer consists of implicitly 
taking into account the international trade structure of the 
country. Indeed, Rer is the nominal exchange rate weighted 
by the ratio of the external price index on the local one. Es-
pecially, Tunisian growth is driven by strong domestic and 
European demands, and other recent diversified sources. In 
its computation, Rer places a wider importance on the prices 
of the main commercial partners that influence the external 
value of the national currency through international trade. 
 G dp and P (the inflation rate) are the two monetary pol-
icy targets on the real sphere. P is measured from the con-
sumption prices index. 
  From January 1988 to June 2007, the monthly data come 
from DataStream and the Tunisian central bank. They are 
converted in millions of constant dollars (basis 2000) and 
transformed in order to work in logarithm. 
  To deal with each monetary transmission, each estimated 
system includes three endogenous variables among the 
aforementioned list of variables: the control variable of the 
monetary policy (Stir), one intermediate variable between 
the monetary and the real sphere i.e. the transmission vari-
able (Ltir or Lr or Dcred or Rer), and one target Gdp or P. 
  Therefore, the mathematical writing of errors for both 
reduced and structural forms of the 8 estimated VAR are 
reported in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Residuals in the VAR 
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  The corresponding structural disturbances are identical 
with  instead of u. 
  To respect the theoretical assumptions concerning each 
transmission mechanism, the SVAR methodology suggests 
imposing restrictions only on the contemporaneous structural 
parameters so that reasonable economic structures might be 
derived (Kim and Roubini [13], Leeper and Roush [14], 
Mojon and Peersman [15], Dedola and Lippi [16]). 
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS IN THE TUNISIAN 
CASE 
  From the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests, all series are integrated of order 1. In appendix, we 
report results of the estimated parameters for the whole 
SVAR systems. 
  Following Benkwitz, Lütkepohl and Wolters [17], some 
small sample properties of bootstrap confidence intervals are 
better in comparison to other asymptotic methodologies. Boot-
strap percentile 95% confidence intervals are computed to 
illustrate parameter uncertainty. The percentile method pro-
posed in [11, 17] is used with 1000 replications. The horizon 
of all responses is 60 months. Figs. (1-4) represent the impulse 
response functions of the targets on the real sphere (Gdp and 
P) after a shock on the short-term interest rate. 
  Focussing on significant responses higher than 1% in the 
Figs. (1-4), the impact of a restrictive monetary policy is the 
following: 
  There is no identifiable long-term impact on the real 
sphere. It points out that it is harder to anchor infla-
tion and output dynamics on specific targets consis-
tent with a good monetary regulation. To stabilize the 
real sphere, controlling the short-term influences of 
monetary shocks is of utmost importance. 
  The output is less reactive than the inflation to mone-
tary shocks. As a consequence, an inflation target 
should be privileged in the monitoring of the Tunisian 
monetary policy. 
  There is no exchange rate transmission mechanism 
extended enough to pay attention to Rer as an inter-
mediate variable for the monetary policy. The un-
steady history of the Tunisian exchange rate regime 
does mitigate this conclusion. The lack of exchange 
rate transmission channel mainly originates from the 
floating but administrated exchange rates in an emer-
gency of instability. Presently, Tunisia is in a transi-
tion period after a long period of administered ex-
change rates. Thus, the exchange rate does not play 
yet a predominant role in amplifying monetary policy 
actions. 
  However, since 2001 Tunisian authorities intervene in 
the market to alleviate the volatility of real exchange rate 
against a basket of currencies to encourage competitiveness. 
Furthermore, The central bank lets the dinar (Tunisian na-
tional currency) depreciates by more than it is required to 
keep the real exchange rate constant in order to partially 
offset the impact of reduced external protection on competi-
tion. But, this exorbitant devaluation will certainly influence 
the inflation in level. To curve imported inflation, monetary  
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Fig. (1). Impulse response functions (Transmission variable: Ltir). 
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Fig. (3). Impulse response functions (Transmission variable: Dcred). 
 
Fig. (4). Impulse response functions (Transmission variable: Rer). 
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authorities still implement a more flexible exchange rate 
regime that has slowed down the price increase since August 
2006. Besides, cautious monetary policy - the central bank 
has already raised its required reserves ratio - and the inten-
tion to take further action if necessary, are expected to keep 
inflation down to 4 percent on average. This expectation also 
takes into account the probable increase in the price of ad-
ministered goods if international prices remain high. 
  Owing to a growing openness degree, managing the sta-
bility of the national currency external value does become 
more accurate. Coordination between monetary and ex-
change policies should be enhanced. 
  A change in the short-term interest rate transitorily affects 
the inflation through various channels. During the first 
six months, a negative peak in the inflation rate is noticed 
extending 5% through the interest rate channel and 3.5% 
through the credit channel in price or in volume. 
  The central bank of Tunisia has a good supervision over 
inflation thanks to a higher importance of its interest rate 
channel. The credit channel should be taken as a comple-
mentary channel to the interest rate one. 
  Strong economic growth coupled with vigilant supervi-
sion should strengthen the financial position of banks. In this 
favorable environment, it is important to pursue efforts to 
reduce non-performing loans. Banking sector reforms like 
the recent privatization of the Tuniso-Kuwaiti Bank do con-
tinue. However, the banking sector remains fragmented. 
Considering heightened competitive pressures, its consolida-
tion would be beneficial. As a recent legal obligation, the 
quality of the banking services has improved and the authori-
ties are committed to conform the international standards. 
  Although most of the necessary legal and regulatory re-
forms are now in place in Tunisia, the challenge is to ensure 
that the financial systems fully operate according to market 
mechanisms underpinned by deregulation and increased com-
petition among financial institutions. Thus, other longer-term 
reforms should aim at enhancing the mobilization of domestic 
savings and the deepening of financial markets. 
  Jbili, Enders and Trechel [18] notice that correlations 
between the private saving and some financial indicators (the 
ratios M2 aggregate on Gdp, monetary reserve on deposits, 
Dcred and the real interest rate) suggest that financial sector 
reforms have encouraged the private saving. Morrisson and 
Talbi [19], Goldsbrough, Coorey, Dicks-Mireaux, Horvath, 
Kohhkar, Mecagni, Offerdal and Zhou [20] find that the total 
factor productivity improves following the reforms. It gives 
evidence of a better factor allocation. 
  Besides, reforms to simplify the design of government 
paper should help strengthen secondary markets for govern-
ment paper and provide meaningful yield curves. This, in 
turn, should facilitate the use of open market operations for 
the central bank. In addition, the remaining mandatory lend-
ing requirements should be abolished and interest rates fully 
liberalized. 
CONCLUSION 
  This paper uses impulse response functions from a 
SVAR methodology in order to emphasize monetary trans-
mission in a Maghreb country. 
  On the one hand, we deduce from a structural analysis that 
the exchange rate channel does not yet play an important role in 
the Tunisian monetary policy transmission. On the other hand, 
the national central bank should adopt an inflation targeting 
based on the long-term interest rate as the main intermediate 
variable, despite the complementarity with the credit variables. 
  This strategy should find convenient financial reforms as 
a companion to insure a good monetary regulation favorable 
to a more stable growth and macroeconomic environment. 
  Nevertheless, to improve the ability of central bankers to 
better manage the monetary transmission, the focus on the 
right intermediate variable or the privileged transmission 
channel should be redefined through time. That is the reason 
why a consistent extension should be based on a more time-
varying SVAR approach. Besides, this extension does inte-
grate the asset prices and the announcement effect channels 




We display as follows the structural parameter estimates of the A and B matrices using a SVAR AB models with contempora-
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We report as follows the structural estimates of A’ and B’ with short and long term restrictions using a 
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